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ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND PROTECTION FROM
DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT: REVERSING THE
EXCLUSION OF ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE AS A DISABILITY
Leslie Francis*
When landlords or employers know that someone is using opioids, either
legally or illegally, the consequences can be significant. Rental housing or
employment are both critical to well-being, yet may be at particularly high risk. As
this Article argues below, legal protections in these areas are inadequate. To
summarize the argument briefly, a crucial legal problem for people suffering from
substance abuse disorders is that current illegal use of controlled substances is
excluded from the definition of disability in federal anti-discrimination statutes. A
history of substance abuse is a disability protected from discrimination, but recent
relapses vitiate this protection. Relatedly, federal law still criminalizes the medical
use of marijuana and federal anti-discrimination law reflects the federal prohibition
rather than legalization under state law. The legal use of prescription opioids and
medication assisted treatment (MAT) is protected under anti-discrimination law, but
many employers subject MAT patients to increased scrutiny and others continue to
insist on drug free workplace policies that prohibit their employment.
The statutory exclusions from anti-discrimination law of current illegal use of
drugs and the statutory requirements for federally-subsidized housing described
below were enacted at the crest of the “war on drugs” during the late 1980s and early
1990s. In 1986, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which
allocated funding for new prisons1 and created mandatory minimum sentences for
drug offenses, including possession.2 The Office of National Drug Control Policy
was also created in 1988.3 President Bush appointed William Bennett to lead the
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1
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1451, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207–40
(1986).
2
Id. § 1052, 100 Stat. at 3207–08.
3
Office of National Drug Control Policy, EXECUTIVE OFF. PRESIDENT U.S.,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ [https://perma.cc/K3YN-Z5VL].
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agency as “drug czar” and he pursued an aggressive policy of law enforcement.4
This framing of drug use as a serious crime that threatens society by its very
existence hovers over anti-discrimination law today.
This Article presents the legal and practical risks to housing and employment
for people who use drugs illegally. Housing and employment were selected because
of their importance to recovery and overall well-being of people with substance
abuse disorders.5 The Article then explains how landlords or employers may become
aware of illegal substance abuse, despite legal protection for medical records and
substance abuse treatment information. It concludes by suggesting that housing and
employment anti-discrimination law should shift from frames of condemnation and
criminalization to the recognition that substance abuse is a disorder, a shift that could
take better account of the needs of people using drugs illegally.
This federal criminalization frame should also be rejected for users of medical
marijuana that is legal under the laws of their states. Instead, successful challenges
to employers’ adverse actions against MAT patients can point the way forward to
reversing the characterization of persons who use substances illegally as criminal
threats, rather than as persons with disabilities who should be protected against
discrimination. The numbers of affected individuals are not trivial: over twenty
million people in the United States are estimated to have substance abuse disorders,6
and over three and a half million are estimated to use medical marijuana according
to state law.7

4

Howard Kohn, Cowboy in the Capital: Drug Czar Bill Bennett, ROLLING STONE (Nov.
2, 1989), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/cowboy-in-the-capital-drugczar-bill-bennett-45472/ [https://perma.cc/D74K-SS7T].
5
See, e.g., Alexandre B. Laudet & William White, What Are Your Priorities Right
Now? Identifying Service Needs Across Recovery Stages to Inform Service Development, 38
J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 51, 55 (2010).
6
AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION 2016 FACTS & FIGURES 1,
https://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V9X-3GMW].
7
Number
of
Legal
Medical
Marijuana
Patients,
PROCON.ORG,
https://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=005889 [https://perma.
cc/QJR4-STB3] (last updated May 17, 2018). This figure is an estimated number of users for
all 50 U.S. states and D.C., if medical marijuana were legal in all states and D.C., based on
a total number of 2.1 million users in 26 out of 29 states and D.C. with legal medical
marijuana. At present, thirty-four states have some form of legal marijuana so the numbers
are surely far higher than these figures represent. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L
CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 5, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/statemedical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8GEJ-QZWD].
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I. HOUSING AND ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
For the many in the United States who do not own their own homes,8 especially
those dependent on subsidies for low-income housing, third-party knowledge of any
current illegal use of controlled substances can potentially result in refusals to rent,
eviction, or loss of rent subsidies. The argument to follow demonstrates how federal
fair housing law provides no protection against these risks. Instead, federal law
governing public housing and rental assistance requires lease terms that specifically
permit eviction for illegal drug use.
In the same year—1988—that Congress added protection against disability
discrimination to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), it specifically tied federal subsidies
for housing to lease provisions that permit eviction for illegal drug use by tenants or
others living in or visiting the dwelling. These provisions reflect judgments
prevalent in the “war on drugs” that drug use by itself is a danger to others and that
federal fair housing law should not open the door to people perceived as “addicts.”
For example, the House Report explaining the exclusion of current illegal drug use
or addiction from the definition of disability in the FHA stated firmly: “This
amendment is intended to exclude current abusers and current addicts of illegal
drugs from protection under this Act. The definition of handicap is not intended to
be used to condone or protect illegal activity.”9
A. Federal Fair Housing Act
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 prohibited discrimination in the sale,
rental, or financing of housing based on race, color, religion, or national origin.10
Sex was added as a category protected against discrimination in 1974,11 and family
status and disability were added in 1988.12 In this addition, disability was defined
specifically to exclude “current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance.”13 Thus, efforts by landlords to evict tenants for illegal drug use or
addiction are not barred as disability discrimination in housing.
An ambiguity in this statutory language about what was meant by “current . . .
or addiction” created difficulty from the outset. In one medical sense, addiction is a
chronic illness; “recovering addicts” are in remission but not “cured.” In another
sense, “addiction” refers to the current uncontrolled use of a substance.14 Programs
8

The Census Bureau estimates that 57.2% of all housing units in the U.S. are owneroccupied, while 31% are renter-occupied units. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau,
Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2018 at 1, 4 (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2
XC-NV8G].
9
H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183.
10
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 804–05, 82 Stat. 73, 83–84 (1968).
11
Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5309 (1974).
12
Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988).
13
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988).
14
United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920 (4th Cir. 1992).
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seeking rental housing for persons in recovery challenged refusals to rent to their
clients as discriminatory, but were met with the contention that these persons
remained “addicts,” despite their participation in the recovery program, and thus
were not protected under the FHA definition of disability.
The House Report indicated that the statutory language did not “intend to
exclude individuals who have recovered from an addition [sic] or are participating
in a treatment program or a self-help group such as Narcotics Anonymous . . . [as]
former drug-dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its inhabitants
simply on the basis of status . . . .”15 This ambiguity was critical to a leading early
decision interpreting the statutory language to protect persons in treatment programs
that insisted that their clients remain drug-free as a condition of continued
participation in the program, but that discharged any client with a positive drug
test.16 Courts have continued to draw this bright line between former and current
addiction, despite the medical recognition that people in treatment programs often
relapse.17 For example, in 2012, an Indiana federal court decided a case in which a
mother and son were subject to eviction because the mother had been caught with
unlawful possession of cocaine, despite her continuing participation in a courtordered rehabilitation program; the court stated:
It is true that there are safe harbor protections for past drug abusers
who have successfully completed, or are participating in a supervised drug
rehabilitation program . . . it is perfectly permissible for an entity—an
employer, a public housing authority etc.—to take an adverse action
against someone who is caught using drugs.18
Importantly, the FHA provides protection for landlords when they act against
tenants who present an actual threat or danger to others or to property. The FHA
makes explicit that its protections against discrimination do not extend to
circumstances in which tenants present a threat to others: “Nothing in this subsection
requires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would
constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy
would result in substantial physical damage to the property of others.”19 This
15

H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183.
S. Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d at 916, 923.
17
Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior-science-addiction/
treatment-recovery [https://perma.cc/7FSL-5686] (last updated July 2018) (“The chronic
nature of addiction means that for some people relapse, or a return to drug use after an
attempt to stop, can be part of the process, but newer treatments are designed to help with
relapse prevention. Relapse rates for drug use are similar to rates for other chronic medical
illnesses . . . Treatment of chronic diseases involves changing deeply rooted behaviors, and
relapse doesn’t mean treatment has failed.”).
18
A.B. ex rel. Kehoe v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, No. 3:11 CV 163 PPS, 2012 WL
1877740, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 18, 2012).
19
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (2018).
16
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provision creates a “direct threat” defense: landlords may refuse to rent to
individuals who threaten others by their presence or their activities. It would permit
landlords to refuse to rent to people whose drug use creates risks of harm, such as
the risks of smoke damage, fire, or contamination from methamphetamine use or
manufacture. The provision would further permit landlords to refuse to rent to people
whose activities intimidate other tenants, such as might occur with drug dealing or
risks of violence.
Without further evidence, however, the defense arguably would not apply in
situations in which persons are prescribed medical marijuana for their own use, or
even consume opioids illegally behind the closed doors of their own apartments.
Indeed—ironically now that physician-prescribed marijuana is to some extent legal
in thirty-three states—the House Report for the FHA specifically stated that the drug
use exclusion was not meant to cover drugs used under physician supervision: “This
exclusion does not eliminate protection for individuals who take drugs defined in
the Controlled Substances Act for a medical condition under the care of, or by
prescription from, a physician. Use of a medically prescribed drug clearly does not
constitute illegal use of a controlled substance.”20
The direct threat provision might also not apply when tenants or their relatives
use drugs illegally away from the premises, unless there were some additional reason
to believe the off-site use would create risks on the premises. Yet, as described
below, tenants in these situations not only are not protected by anti-discrimination
law, but also are likely to be subject to eviction from housing and loss of rental
assistance when they receive federal low-income rental subsidies.
B. Federal Low-Income Housing Subsidies
In 1937, Congress passed the Housing Act to assist the states in providing
“decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for families of low income, in rural or urban
communities . . . .”21 While the basic structure of the Housing Act has changed in
the years since, the purpose of providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing has
remained the same.22
The current makeup of the federally-subsidized housing program is derived
from the Housing and Community Development Act (HDCA), enacted in 1974.23
HDCA amended Section 8 of the original Housing Act of 1937,24 and federally
subsidized housing is now widely referred to as “Section 8 Housing.”25 Section 8
20

H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2183.
Wagner-Steagall Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888, 888 (1937).
22
Roberta L. Rubin, Public Housing Development—Mixed Finance in the Context of
Historical Trends, in NAVIGATING HUD PROGRAMS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
LABYRINTH 232–34 (George Weidenfeller & Julie McGovern eds., 2012).
23
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2018)).
24
See id.
25
See, e.g., Housing Choice Vouchers Facts Sheet, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/
topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 [https://perma.cc/HQ7N-G2XA].
21

896

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Housing is distinguished from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD)’s traditional public housing program in which the government
owns the housing units, inasmuch as Section 8 Housing deals with housing owned
by a private landowner.26 Approximately two million residents live in traditional
public housing units, which are managed by approximately 3,300 local housing
agencies.27 In contrast, approximately 4.7 million residents live in Section 8
Housing.28 More than half of these Section 8 households have a head or a spouse
who is an elderly adult or a person with disabilities.29
Two primary programs come under Section 8 Housing: project-based
assistance and tenant-based assistance.30 Project-based assistance is based on the
specific housing unit.31 Tenant-based assistance allocates assistance specific to the
tenant and will follow the tenant to whichever housing unit he or she selects.32 In
project-based housing, the landlord contracts with a Public Housing Agency (PHA),
agrees to set aside a certain number of units for Section 8 Housing, and receives
vouchers directly from the PHA.33 In tenant-based projects, the tenant works directly
with the PHA, receives the housing voucher, and can use it on a rental unit that he
or she chooses.34 Under either of these programs, the tenant pays a “tenant rent,”
which is typically thirty percent of his or her adjusted gross income, and the
government pays the owner the remaining balance of the rent pursuant to the housing
assistance payment contract.35
In 1988, Congress judged that “public housing projects in many areas suffer
from rampant drug related crime . . . .” and decided to take action against drug use
in traditional public housing.36 In Congress’s judgment, drug-related crime leads to
murders, muggings, and other forms of violence, and also causes the “deterioration
of the physical environment that requires governmental expenditures . . . .”37
Moreover, Congress found that the “Federal Government has a duty to provide
public housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs . . . .”38 Therefore,
26

See HUD’s Public Housing Program, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_
assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/NW6E-XEED].
27
Id.; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH IN PUB. HOUS., DEMOGRAPHIC FACTS:
RESIDENTS LIVING IN PUBLIC HOUSING 1 (2016) [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT].
28
DEMOGRAPHIC REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
29
Alicia Mazzara & Barbara Sard, Chart Book: Employment and Earnings for
Households Receiving Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES
(Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-employment-andearnings-for-households-receiving-federal-rental [https://perma.cc/ZNV9-DM5V].
30
HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, 10 MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL EST. §
34:265 (4th ed. 2018).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11901 (1988).
37
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4301 (1988).
38
Id.

2019]

REVERSING THE EXCLUSION OF ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE

897

Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA),39 which requires that each
public housing agency under the traditional housing program use a tenant lease that
provides that “drug-related criminal activity, on or near public housing premises,
while the tenant is a tenant in public housing, and such criminal activity shall be
cause for termination of tenancy.”40 Ten years later, in 1998, Congress imposed
similar requirements on Section 8 housing with the passage of the Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA).41 The QHWRA required that contracts
between a public housing agency and an owner of existing housing units provide
that “during the term of the lease . . . any drug-related criminal activity on or near
such premises, engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant’s
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy[.]”42
Although these lease provisions are mandatory, there may be some discretion
in how they are implemented in actual eviction decisions. In 2002, the Supreme
Court decided Rucker v. Davis wherein four tenants facing eviction from traditional
public housing in Oakland, California, challenged their evictions based on the
argument that they had no knowledge of or ability to control the behavior of other
occupants of the unit.43 Two of the evicted tenants were grandparents whose
grandsons, and residents of the unit, had been caught in possession of marijuana in
the unit parking lot.44 Another eviction involved a resident whose daughter with
intellectual disabilities had been found with cocaine and a crack cocaine pipe three
blocks away from the unit and whose son (not an apartment resident) had been found
with cocaine eight blocks away.45 The caregiver of the last of the tenants, a disabled
man, had been found with cocaine in the apartment.46 The tenants contended that the
ADAA did not require eviction of innocent tenants and that, if it did, it was
unconstitutional as a violation of a property interest without due process.47
In ruling against the Rucker tenants, the Court found that the statute
“unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with
the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members
39

Id.
Id. at 4300; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2018) (“[A]ny drug-related criminal
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the
tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy.”).
41
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461
(1998).
42
Id. at 2600; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(iii) (2018) (“[D]uring the term of the
lease . . . any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a tenant
of any unit, any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under the
tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.”).
43
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002).
44
Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98–00781 CRB, 1998 WL 345403, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
1998), rev’d and vacated, 403 F.3d 627 (9th Cir. 2000).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
40
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and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the
activity.”48 The Court found that “[r]egardless of knowledge, a tenant who cannot
control drug crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which
threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents and the
project.”49 Notably, this reasoning assumes that illegal drug use is itself a threat to
others; in none of the cases were there allegations that the use in question had
actually or potentially resulted in threats or harm to other residents beyond the mere
fact of use.50 This reasoning followed HUD’s assumptions in requiring the lease
terms that drug use is itself a threat and that drug use and drug dealing should be
viewed as the same kind of threat.51 The Court also noted, however, that “[t]he
statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease
provision.”52 Rather, it entrusts
the local public housing authorities, who are in the best position to take
account of, among other things, the degree to which the housing project
suffers from rampant drug-related or violent crime, the seriousness of the
offending action, and the extent to which the leaseholder has . . . taken all
reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.53
Therefore, the agency has discretion to determine whether to pursue an eviction
or ejectment action on any particular tenant who violates the drug-provision of the
lease.54
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the reasoning in Rucker
would also apply to the lease terms required for Section 8 subsidies, some federal
appellate decisions have upheld evictions for drug use in cases in which there was
no showing of danger to other residents beyond the fact of drug use. For example,
Lawrence Kelly and his son Michael were evicted from an apartment in Topeka,
Kansas, after Michael had been arrested on drug possession charges, even though
Michael pled not guilty and was placed on diversion.55 In a case involving traditional
public housing, Silas Taylor, a resident with hearing and speech impairments, was
evicted after convictions of possessing drug paraphernalia, despite the fact that there
48

Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Public Housing Lease and
Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560-1, 51,567 (Oct. 11, 1991)).
50
Id.
51
Public Housing Lease and Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51,560, 51,563 (Oct.
11, 1991) (discussing that the law provides specifically that a public housing tenancy may
be terminated for drug-related and other serious criminal activity by a “guest” of the
household. Such criminal activities by drug dealers and other persons who enter at the
invitation of household members are a threat to the welfare of project residents and PHA
employees).
52
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133–34 (2002).
53
Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted).
54
Id.
55
Kelly v. Topeka Hous. Auth., 147 Fed. App’x 723, 724 (10th Cir. 2005).
49
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was no evidence he had actually possessed drugs or distributed them and despite
evidence that he was likely to become homeless as a result of the eviction.56
Dierdre Lawrence, a tenant who had been convicted of drug dealing, was
evicted despite the fact that she had successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program and was likely to become homeless with her three children;57 the court
wrote explicitly that “Plaintiff’s conduct violated the prohibition on drug-related
criminal activity; therefore, it need not also be a threat.”58 Florence Tinnin, a 67year-old woman with disabilities, was evicted and her Section 8 benefits were
terminated after a conviction of cocaine possession and an admission that she had
sold drugs—despite evidence of her good character, regret, and cessation of any
criminal activities.59 The hearing office had reached out beyond her authority to
recommend that Ms. Tinnin’s benefits be restored, but the court instead blamed her
for her bad behavior: “As a member of the Section 8 program, Ms. Tinnin held a
spot coveted by many needy and law-abiding White Plains residents . . . . To make
room for these deserving residents, PHA seeks to evict Section 8 participants who
deal drugs.”60 Here, the court not only blamed Ms. Tinnin, but used language
sounding the theme that it would be unfair for her to continue to benefit from rental
subsidies when others were waiting.61
C. Section 8 Subsidies and Medical Marijuana
Landlord-tenant law and eviction proceedings have standardly been matters of
state law in the United States. States may have standards for evictions that are more
protective of tenants than the lease provisions required for federal housing subsidies.
Thirty-three states have now legalized medical marijuana to at least some extent,62
yet marijuana use in any form remains illegal under federal law. Some states also
have provisions in their medical marijuana laws that prohibit landlords from
discriminating against persons permitted to use medical marijuana, unless the
landlord is required to do so by federal law or for federal funding.63
Whether the statutory federal lease requirements preempt these state laws has
received varying answers in several court decisions. For example, in Chateau
Foghorn LP v. Hosford, a Maryland landlord brought an eviction action against a
56

Taylor v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314, 317, 322–23 (D.N.J. 1995).
Lawrence v. Town of Brookhaven Dep’t of Hous., Cmty. Dev. & Intergovernmental
Affairs, No. 07-CV-2243 (JS)(WDW), 2007 WL 4591845, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2007).
58
Id. at *10.
59
Tinnin v. Section 8 Program of White Plains, 706 F. Supp. 2d 401, 402, 408
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
60
Id. at 402.
61
Id.
62
State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 11, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/
8GEJ-QZWD].
63
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813(B) (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a408p(b)(2) (2019).
57
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tenant after the tenant was criminally cited for possession of a marijuana plant grown
in his apartment.64 The disabled tenant, who experienced muscle spasms and pain,
had grown the plant for his own medical use.65 At the time, possession of the amount
of marijuana in question was a criminal offense under Maryland law, although the
statute permitting medical marijuana in Maryland became effective four months
later.66 The plant’s presence came to light when exterminators treating all units in
the complex observed it; the tenant was charged with possession of marijuana,
charges that were ultimately not prosecuted.67 Nonetheless, based on the citation, the
landlord brought an eviction action against the tenant, citing the required Section 8
lease provision.68 The trial court grated summary judgment and restitution of
possession to the landlord on the basis that marijuana possession was against the
Maryland law in effect at the time and against federal law.69 The court also reasoned
that the jury was entitled to credit the landlord’s discretion in evicting the tenant by
analogizing Rucker to landlords of Section 8 tenants, but that the provisions of state
law were preempted.70
The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the Maryland law requiring
a “substantial” breach of the terms of the lease for eviction was not preempted.71 In
thus concluding, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that in areas of law
traditionally for the states, such as landlord-tenant law, state law is only preempted
if enforcing it would cause major damage to substantial interests embedded in any
conflicting federal laws.72 The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed that landlordtenant law is a traditional domain of the states and that, on a heightened presumption
against preemption, the Maryland law of evictions did not conflict with Congress’s
intent in mandating the lease provision.73 Therefore, because Maryland requires a
breach of a lease to be “substantial and warrants an eviction,” a court is allowed to
deny an eviction even if a tenant commits a drug-related crime if the breach of the
lease is not substantial.74
Hosford may be a decision that is unusually sympathetic to tenants using
medical marijuana, however. In January 2019, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
upheld an eviction for possession and use of medical marijuana in federally funded
affordable housing.75 The eviction notice cited the tenant not only for unlawfully
growing marijuana, but also for refusing access to the bedroom where the marijuana
was growing, installing a lock on the room without permission, threatening property
64

Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 168 A.3d 824, 828 (Md. 2017).
Id. at 830.
66
Id. at 830–31.
67
Id. at 828.
68
Id. at 829.
69
Id. at 830.
70
Id. at 831.
71
Id. at 832–33.
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Id. at 833.
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Id. at 835.
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Id.
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Id. at 835–36.
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staff who sought to enter the bedroom, and smoking marijuana in the apartment in
violation of a no smoking policy.76 The trial court’s “most important finding” was
that the tenant had possessed marijuana in violation of the lease and federal law.77
In denying the tenant’s appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court relied on
additional violations of the lease: the refusal to allow the landlord to enter the
apartment for inspection, the installment of the lock without permission, and the
effort to intimidate staff from entering the room.78 Arguably, however, these
additional violations were in response to the tenant’s fears that discovery of the
marijuana would result in his eviction.79 To take another example, an intermediate
appellate court in Washington state has also upheld an eviction for violation of the
anti-drug policy in Section 8 housing.80
Federal court decisions also conclude that federal law preempts state medical
marijuana laws. For example, a Michigan tenant in Section 8 housing sought to use
physician-prescribed medical marijuana pursuant to Michigan’s Medical Marijuana
Act to alleviate the symptoms of her multiple sclerosis faced this problem.81 She was
told in a declarative judgment, in favor of the landlord, that she was not entitled to
use medical marijuana as a reasonable accommodation for her disability under the
Fair Housing Act.82 Evidence indicates that many Section 8 Housing tenants are
routinely prohibited from using medical marijuana.83 As noted by the trial court in
Hosford, landlords and PHAs may still use a tenant’s possession of marijuana, even
for medical purposes, as grounds for eviction.84
Federal policies in effect in 2019 also favor enforcement of the federal
prohibitions over state law. In 2011, HUD offered a memorandum to PHAs that
instructed them to deny all Section 8 Housing applicants if they use marijuana for

76

Sherwood Assocs. LP v. Jackson, 200 A.3d 1259, 1261–62 (Me. 2019).
Id. at 1262–63.
78
Id. at 1264. The tenant had posted a sign on the bedroom that read: “No one may
enter this room! [. . .] Trespassers will be shot! Survivors shot again!” Id.
79
Id.
80
Anacortes Hous. Auth. v. Assenberg, No. 58716–1–I, 2007 WL 3348459, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2007). Violation of the apartment pet policy was a second ground
for the eviction, although the tenant claimed his snakes were therapy animals. Id. at *3
81
Forest City Residential Mgmt., Inc. v. Beasley, 71 F. Supp. 3d 715, 721 (E.D. Mich.
2014).
82
Id. at 732.
83
See, e.g., Sarah Simmons, Comment: Medical Marijuana Use in Federally
Subsidized Housing: The Argument for Overcoming Federal Preemption. 48 U. BALT. L.
REV. 117, 123–25 (2018); Geoffrey Marshall, Medical Marijuana Users Are Being Shut Out
of
Public
Housing,
AM.
FOR
SAFE
ACCESS
(Sept.
14,
2018),
https://www.safeaccessnow.org/medical_marijuana_users_are_being_shut_out_of_public_
housing [https://perma.cc/5BRV-Z6GA].
84
Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 168 A.3d 824, 831 (Md. 2017); see also Assenberg,
2007 WL 3348459, at *4 (finding an eviction based on tenant’s medical marijuana
possession was appropriate).
77
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any reason.85 In 2014, under President Obama’s administration, another memo
instructed landlords and PHAs that under the QHWRA they must continue to deny
admission to all applicants using medical marijuana, must establish policies that
allow the termination of tenancy of households with members using medical
marijuana, but have discretion about terminating tenancy in these latter situations.86
In early 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a memorandum to all U.S.
Attorneys rescinding any earlier guidance to federal prosecutors that had deprioritized prosecutions for marijuana activities in accord with state law.87 In 2018,
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton from the District of Columbia, introduced
a bill to Congress that would disallow any PHA or Section 8 landlord from including
lease provisions that prohibit the use of marijuana in accordance with state law,88
but the legislation had not progressed as of this writing.
II. EMPLOYMENT AND ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment,
public services, and public accommodations. To the extent that housing or housing
subsidies are public services89 or public accommodations,90 they are covered by the
ADA in addition to federal housing law. Like the FHA, the ADA defines disability
specifically to exclude current illegal use of controlled substances.91 With enactment
of the ADA in 1990, the definition of disability in the Rehabilitation Act was also
amended to incorporate this exclusion.92 Unlike the FHA, however, the ADA
specifically removes any ambiguity about what is meant by “current addiction”:

85
Memorandum from Sandra B. Henriquex, Assistant Sec’y for Pub. & Indian Hous.
to the U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Medical Marijuana Use in Public Housing and
Housing Choice Voucher Programs (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/
MED-MARIJUANA.PDF [https://perma.cc/FG8N-BMFB].
86
Memorandum from Benjamin T. Metcalf, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Multifamily
Hous. Programs to the U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Use of Marijuana in Multifamily
Assisted Properties (Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/USEOFMARIJ
INMFASSISTPROPTY.PDF [https://perma.cc/9WB8-6RKD].
87
Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Attorney Gen. to all U.S. Attorneys,
Marijuana
Enforcement
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/6W72-QTYM].
88
Press Release, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Norton Introduces Bill to Permit Marijuana
Use in Public Housing (June 19, 2008) https://norton.house.gov/media-center/pressreleases/norton-introduces-bill-to-permit-marijuana-use-in-public-housing [https://perma.cc
/UR76-LT7K].
89
The public services provision of the ADA includes state and local governments and
any of their agencies or instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)–(B) (2018). The
Rehabilitation Act, which works in tandem with the ADA, prohibits disability discrimination
in federally funded programs. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2018).
90
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (2018).
91
Id. § 12210(a).
92
H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 93 (1993).
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[N]othing in . . . this section shall be construed to exclude as an
individual with a disability an individual who (1) has successfully
completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated
successfully and is no longer engaging in such use; (2) is participating in
a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such
use.93
As with housing, persons who relapse during treatment lose any protection
under this provision. Moreover, former employees may be unprotected as well; the
Supreme Court has held that dismissal for prior misconduct, including illegal drug
use, is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for an employer to refuse to rehire a
prospective employee who has successfully completed treatment for a substance
abuse disorder.94
Apart from this exclusion from the definition of disability, the ADA protects
employers from problems associated with drug use by their employees in a number
of important ways. Employees must be “qualified” to perform essential functions of
the jobs they seek,95 and employers are given considerable deference in deciding
what those essential functions are.96 Although it is discrimination to fail to provide
reasonable accommodations that enable employees to perform essential job
functions,97 even legal drug use may not be considered a reasonable accommodation
if there are grounds for concerns about performance or safety.
In addition, like the FHA, the ADA provides a direct threat defense for
employers. The ADA states specifically that “qualification standards” for
employment “may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”98 Although the
statutory language refers “to other individuals,” the Supreme Court has held that
threats to self are also covered by the direct threat defense.99 Public services may be
limited to “qualified” individuals with a disability who “meet[] the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs
or activities provided by the public entity.”100 Although “essential eligibility
requirements” are not defined in the statute, the implementing regulations include a
direct threat defense.101 The public accommodations provisions of the ADA also
specifically provide that:
93

42 U.S.C. § 12210(b)(1)–(2) (2018). The court in United States v. S. Mgmt. Corp.,
955 F.2d 914, 923 (4th Cir. 1992) relied specifically on this provision in its interpretation of
“current addiction.”
94
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 (2003).
95
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2018).
96
Id. § 12111(8).
97
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
98
Id. § 12113(b).
99
Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 74 (2002).
100
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2018).
101
28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2018).
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Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an individual
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages and accommodations of such entity where such individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The term “direct
threat” means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot
be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by
the provision of auxiliary aids or services.102
The exclusion of current illegal drug use from the ADA definition of disability
poses significant problems for employees challenging adverse employment actions
resulting from knowledge of their substance use. Employees who have not been in
treatment for very long or who relapse during treatment frequently fall within this
exclusion, as will be discussed below. Employees who use medical marijuana as
legally prescribed in their state are also within the exclusion. By contrast, while
employees successfully undergoing MAT frequently confront adverse action from
their employers, they can claim the protections of the ADA. How these protections
work are helpful illustrations for how reversing the exclusion of illegal drug use
from the definition of disability might work in practice.
A. Employees Beginning Treatment
The exclusion of “current” users of illegal drugs from ADA protections has
frequently encompassed employees seeking or beginning treatment. Employees who
self-report problems in order to get help may face adverse action but be unable to
claim any ADA protections. In a leading case, a pharmacist who realized he should
not come to work because he was in an impaired state reported his condition and
requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FLMA) to undergo
treatment.103 Instead of being granted the leave, he was terminated.104 In the
pharmacist’s subsequent ADA suit after successful rehabilitation treatment, the
court granted the employer summary judgment because the pharmacist had been a
current user of illegal drugs when the employer terminated him, and because as a
cocaine user at the time, he was not qualified to work as a pharmacist.105 In this case,
there was no evidence that the pharmacist had ever been impaired on the job,
although at one earlier point he had been placed on probation, which he had
completed successfully.106 Cases such as this one are counter-productive; they may
discourage individuals from seeking treatment out of concern for their jobs.
Individuals who struggle along without treatment may also face excessive

102

42 U.S.C. § 12182(3) (2018).
Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1999).
104
Id. at 852.
105
Id. at 853.
106
Id. at 851.
103
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absenteeism or lapses in performance that provide independent justification for
adverse employment action but that might have been avoided with earlier treatment.
Courts also have found it difficult to decide how long an employee must be in
treatment to be considered no longer a “current” drug user. According to one case,
it may be “weeks (or even months).”107 Refusing to set a bright line (is a month not
enough?), courts have been unclear about whether the problem is the recency of the
drug use, the reasonableness of the employer’s belief that the employee may still be
using drugs, or the employer’s reliance on judgments that the employee’s prognosis
is poor. For example, a sales representative who had entered an outpatient drug
rehabilitation program tested positive for drugs; he was fired by his employer but
told he could return if he “could get clean.”108 He completed inpatient rehabilitation
with a “guarded” prognosis and was offered re-employment, but at reduced duties
and compensation, which he refused.109 The court, in upholding summary judgment
for the employer, stated that there was no bright line for current drug use but that the
drug use must have “occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual is
actively engaged in such conduct”;110 that the drug use must be “sufficiently recent
to justify the employer’s reasonable belief that the drug abuse remained an ongoing
problem”;111 and that factors that may be considered include “the severity of the
employee’s addiction and the relapse rates for whatever drugs were used.”112
A contrasting approach to considering whether adverse action against an
employee with a substance abuse disorder looks to the employee’s ability to perform
job functions, rather than length of sobriety. In a case involving a telephone
maintainer for a commuter railroad, the court said:
For an employer to assume that simply because of a handicap an individual
is unable to function in a given employment context stereotypes that
person, seeing him, as it were, through a glass, darkly. . . . [and] effects the
discrimination forbidden . . . At the same time nothing in the statute
prevents an employer from making a decision based on the job-related
attributes of a person’s handicap.113
B. Employees Undergoing Treatment But Relapsing
Employees who relapse while they are undergoing treatment may also be
considered “current” drug users and thus lose protection against disability
discrimination.114 Many of the reported cases involving relapsing employees or
107

Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 2013).
Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1186 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3).
111
Id. at 1187 (quoting Zenor, 176 F.3d at 856).
112
Id. at 1188 (citation omitted) .
113
Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co., 951 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1991).
114
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, FACT SHEET:
DRUG ADDICTION AND FEDERAL DISABILITY RIGHTS LAWS 1 (Oct. 25, 2018),
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employees whose participation in rehabilitation programs is erratic involve positions
where there are risks to others, such as health care or transportation. In these
situations, it is not discrimination based on disability to refuse to reinstitute
employees whose current use or risk of drug use poses problems of fitness for duty.
The decisions are based on whether the employee is qualified for the job115 and
whether the employee poses a direct threat to themselves or others.
C. Employees Using Medical Marijuana
As noted above, thirty-three states now allow medical marijuana in at least
some form. Some of these statutes include state law non-discrimination
provisions.116 Other states allow employers to impose drug-free workplace policies
and dismiss employees for failing random drug tests.117 Oregon has held that the
federal ADA exclusion of illegal substance use preempts requests for
accommodation of off-duty use of medical marijuana under state law.118 Several
decisions have refused ADA protections for employees who use medical marijuana
in compliance with the laws of their states. For example, the decision to terminate a
Colorado truck driver who used medical marijuana off-the-job to treat back pain was
upheld.119 A Michigan nursing administrator at an assisted living facility was denied
ADA protection after she was fired when a drug test revealed that she used medical
marijuana for her epilepsy.120
On the other hand, in a case not involving an ADA claim, a Walmart customer
service supervisor successfully contended that she had been wrongfully
discriminated against under Arizona’s law protecting employees with medical
marijuana cards from discrimination.121 Massachusetts has also held that employees
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/drug-addiction-aand-federal-disability-rights-lawsfact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BKC-VNMV] [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
115
See, e.g., Smith v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 11-cv-986, 2018 WL 1293228, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 13, 2018) (holding that a locomotive engineer with continuing substance abuse
problems posed safety risk); Herbst v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-18-TLS, 2019 WL
438070, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 4, 2019) (concluding that a locomotive engineer is a safety
sensitive position).
116
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2813 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-408p(b)(3)
(2019), DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16 § 4905A(a)(3) (2019).
117
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-230 to -239 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-73500, 41-1-15 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-38-1 to -15 (2019).
118
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 536
(Or. 2010). But see Noffsinger v. SSCNiantic Operating Co. LLC, 273 F.Supp. 3d 326 (D.
Conn. 2017) (concluding that Connecticut prohibition of employment discrimination against
authorized users of medical marijuana is not preempted).
119
Steele v. Stallion Rockies Ltd., 106 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1213 (D. Colo. 2015).
120
E.E.O.C. v. Pines of Clarkston, No. 13–CV–14076, 2015 WL 1951945, *1 (E.D.
Mich. Apr. 29, 2015) (discussing whether an employee was terminated due to her epilepsy
or due to her use of medical marijuana).
121
Whitmire v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. CV-17-08108-PCT-JAT, 2019 WL 479842,
at *27 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2019).
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may assert a civil action for disability discrimination when they are fired for testing
positive for marijuana to treat Crohn’s disease.122
This is an emerging area in which the law is unclear; removal of the exclusion
of illegal substance use from the definition of disability might return attention in
these cases to whether the employee was a person with a disability who was capable
of performing essential job functions with or without accommodations.
III. EMPLOYEES USING MEDICATION ASSISTED TREATMENT (MAT)
MAT is legal use of controlled substances, such as methadone or suboxone, in
combination with other therapies to suppress cravings and block the euphoria
associated with opioid use.123 Because people being treated with MAT are not using
substances illegally, they thus do not fall under the exclusion from the definition of
disability.124 However, as this section describes, employees undergoing MAT
continue to face adverse employment actions based on their use of MAT. Some of
these employees, joined by the EEOC on their behalf, have challenged these policies
as disability discrimination. These cases illustrate how employees may successfully
claim the protections of the ADA that require individualized assessments of their
ability to perform essential job functions. They also illustrate how employers may
be protected from employees who function inadequately or pose safety risks.
Since the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), claims of disability
required for protection from discrimination are to be construed “in favor of broad
coverage.”125 Disability determinations also are not to take mitigating measures into
account;126 someone undergoing MAT would be assessed for whether their addiction
without the treatment would substantially affect a major life activity. Determination
of whether someone is a person with a disability requires an individualized inquiry,
so the question for anyone using MAT would be whether without MAT they would
be substantially limited in a major life activity.127 Since the ADAAA, employees
have been more likely to succeed in establishing that they qualify as disabled and
thus can claim the protections of the statute.128

122

Barbuto v. Advantage Salds and Mktg., LLC, 78 N.E.3d 37, 40 (Mass. 2017).
Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT), SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH
ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment [https://perma.cc/SA28B5T9].
124
See FACT SHEET, supra note 114, at 2.
125
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2018).
126
Id. § 12102(4)(E).
127
See, e.g., Lopreato v. Select Specialty Hosp.-N. Kentucky, LLC, No. 12–217–DLB–
JGW, 2014 WL 6804221, at *6–7 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 3, 2014). Employees may also claim that
they are regarded as disabled; if so, they come within the statutory protections of the ADA
but are not entitled to accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2018).
128
See, e.g., Stephen E. Befort, An Empirical Analysis of Case Outcomes Under the
ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2057–58 (2013); Michael Ashley
Stein et al., Accommodating Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 720 (2014).
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The likely problem for patients using MAT is that employers will refuse to hire
them, claiming that they are not qualified because of the medications they take. The
EEOC has pursued a number of these cases of blanket refusals to employ persons
using MAT. For example, the EEOC recently filed a complaint against Steel Painters
for firing a journeyman painter after they learned he was on methadone treatment.129
The EEOC has sued Norfolk Southern Railway for their qualification standard that
barred anyone on MAT from certain positions without the required individualized
analysis of whether they could perform the jobs safely with or without
accommodations.130
Persons using MAT may also meet with the claim that they present a direct
threat to health or safety. For example, a copper fabricating company rescinded a
job offer to a production laborer on MAT with methadone.131 Their claim was that
the position involved safety sensitive work, which he could not perform safely while
on MAT.132 The employer relied on an expert who had not examined the employee
or consulted with his MAT physician.133 The court refused to grant summary
judgment to the employer because there was a triable issue of fact on whether an
individualized assessment would show that the employee posed a threat to himself
or others.134 The direct threat defense requirement of an individualized assessment
had not been met by the employer.135 The case later went to trial, and the employer
agreed to pay $85,000 in a private settlement.136

129

Complaint at 4–5, E.E.O.C. v. Steel Painters, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00303 (E.D. Tex.
June 28, 2018).
130
E.E.O.C. v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 2:17-cv-01251-CRE, 2018 WL 4334615, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2018); see also Lewis v. U.S. Steel Corp. Fairfield Works, No. 2:14-cv01965-AKK, 2016 WL 7373733, at *9–13 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 20, 2016) (recognizng that
employers must provide “objective, individualized” evidence that an individual with
disabilities is a direct threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace before the
employer may remove the individual from the employee’s duties).
131
See E.E.O.C. v. Hussey Copper Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510–11 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 521.
135
Id.
136
Dori Meinert, Company Settles Methadone Treatment Case, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hrmagazine/pages/methadonetreatment.aspx [https://perma.cc/V29D-NTPY].
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These cases illustrate the importance of ADA protections for employees using
MAT. Employees are able to insist on individualized assessment of whether they are
disabled, whether they are qualified to perform essential job functions with or
without accommodations, and whether they pose any actual danger. Stereotypes
such as that they are addicts, are untrustworthy, or should “get cleaned up” cannot
be applied to them.137
IV. PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT SUBSTANCE ABUSE OR TREATMENT
Medical records of individuals undergoing treatment for substance abuse are
stringently protected. These protections were designed to encourage people to seek
treatment for their conditions. Unfortunately, however, landlords and employers
have many other fully legal ways to learn about substance abuse, especially but not
only, when the abuse involves actions that are illegal.
Regulations adopted under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) protect the privacy and security of identifiable medical records
possessed by covered entities. With very few exceptions, all health care providers in
the United States today are HIPAA-covered entities, as they maintain at least some
records in electronic form138 for billing purposes.139 Employers may request that
employees provide copies of medical records to support claims for accommodations
that will enable them to perform essential job functions.140 Employers may also
request records to substantiate applications for leave under FLMA.141 Health care
providers may only comply with these requests, however, if the employee signs an
appropriate authorization.142
In addition to these general protections for medical records, the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Treatment Act (SAMHSA) regulations afford particularly
strong safeguards for substance abuse treatment records. The purpose of these “part
2” regulations is explicitly to “ensure that a patient receiving treatment for a
substance use disorder in a part 2 program is not made more vulnerable by reason of
the availability of their patient record than an individual with a substance use
137

See, e.g., Clipse v. Commercial Driver Servs., Inc., 358 P.3d 464, 474 (Wash. App.
2015) (applying Washington state anti-discrimination law).
138
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
139
The most relevant likely exception may be some psychoanalysts whose patients do
not rely on insurance for payment. See Graham L. Spruiell, Boundary Violations by Third
Parties, 47 AM. PSYCHOANALYST 1, 25 (2013), http://www.apsa.org/sites/default/files/TAP
%202013%20vol47no1.pdf [https://perma.cc/27U4-H8YC].
140
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PROCEDURES FOR PROVIDING
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, https://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/internal/reasonable_accommodation.cfm#_Toc531079193 [https://perma.cc/GH
M7-RXLR].
141
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., THE EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 28 (2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/employer
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K8Q-96NN].
142
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (2018).
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disorder who does not seek treatment.”143 The part 2 regulations apply to treatment
received in any substance abuse treatment facility receiving federal assistance.144
They require specific written consent for any disclosure outside of the treatment
relationship.145 Thus, if a substance abuse treatment record is transferred to another
provider, any subsequent disclosure of the substance abuse treatment information
also requires specific written consent. Moreover, these restrictions on disclosure
apply to any information that might identify a patient as having a substance abuse
disorder, whether directly or indirectly through linkage to other available
information.146
These stringent protections do not apply to information outside of their scope,
however, and both landlords and employers may learn about substance abuse in
many ways other than through health records.
A. Landlords’ Access to Information About Illegal Substance Abuse
Landlords pursue a number of methods to investigate whether tenants receiving
federal rental subsidies may be engaging in illegal drug use. These methods may
detect drug use that has no apparent consequences for others, that did not occur in
public, and that was not a source of complaints from other residents. For example,
subsidized housing units may be searched for health or safety reasons.147 These
searches may be aimed to detect the presence of drugs and include police and drugsniffing dogs. Residents have argued that these searches require warrants, absent
exigent circumstances or resident consent.148 Resident consent may be express or
implied from the circumstances but may not be coerced.149
Landlords may require drug screening as a condition for approving rentals to
Section 8 tenants,150 and they may also conduct background checks. These are
subject to the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which include the
applicants’ written permission and notice of any adverse action.151 However,
potential tenants will learn only after the fact that they have been turned down for
an apartment because of the information in a credit report, and this is likely to be too
late to provide them with realistic protection. Various state laws may also protect
tenants from adverse actions based on information in credit reports.
143

42 C.F.R. § 2.2(b)(2) (2018).
Id. § 2.12(b).
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Id. § 2.31(a).
146
Id. § 2.12(a)(i).
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See Gutierrez v. City of East Chicago, No. 2:16-CV-111-JVB-PRC, 2016 WL
5819818, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2016).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., Peery v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 13-CV-5819, 2014 WL 4913565, *6
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 791 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know, FED. TRADE COMM’N
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A currently contested question about the extent to which tenants are protected
is whether an arrest or an indictment is sufficient evidence to warrant eviction. To
illustrate, in one case ongoing as of this writing, the appellate court held that two
indictments on charges of drug dealing were insufficient to reach the due process
standard of proof required for termination of benefits.152 This decision will be heard
en banc by the Eleventh Circuit.153
The federal regulations provide that a PHA may use the tenant’s criminal record
if the tenant is given notice, a copy of the criminal record, and an opportunity to
respond to the accuracy of the record.154 Under President Obama, HUD offered
guidance to PHAs instructing them that they should not use tenants’ arrest records
of drug possession as the sole grounds for evicting tenants from federally provided
affordable housing.155 Rather, the guidance provided that “[t]he conduct, not the
arrest, is what is relevant for admissions and tenancy decisions.”156
This HUD guidance was invoked when cross motions for summary judgment
were denied by a New York state district court in a drug related eviction proceeding
in a public housing project. The motions were denied because a mere arrest and
guilty plea to attempted criminal possession of controlled substance is not a
conclusive basis to evict under the federally mandated lease provision.157 While the
arrest was insufficient grounds to evict the tenant, the court held the facts warranted
a hearing to determine whether the tenant did in fact possess drugs in breach of the
lease agreement158—so the arrest got the eviction process started.
B. Employers’ Access to Information About Illegal Substance Abuse
The ADA circumscribes permitted medical examinations carefully. No medical
examinations or inquiries are permissible at the pre-employment stage, except for
inquiries about an applicant’s ability to perform essential job functions.159 After an
employer makes an offer, it may require medical examinations of all entering

152

See Yarbrough v. Decatur Hous. Auth., 905 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2018), reh’g
granted, 914 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2019).
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Id.
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24 C.F.R. § 982.553(d)(2) (2019).
155
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NOTICE PIH 2015-19, GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC
HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING ON
EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST IN HOUSING DECISIONS 2–3 (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH2015-19.PDF [https://perma.cc/C5QG-HLCK].
156
Id. at 4.
157
See Town of Oyster Bay Hous. Auth. v. Garcia, 70 N.Y.S.3d 816, 816 (N.Y. Dist.
Ct. 2018).
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Id. In another eviction case in New York, the court held that evidence of an arrest
off-site for cocaine possession was insufficient evidence to support a hearing officer’s
finding that the tenant had engaged in criminal activity. See Rivera v. Town of Huntington
Hous. Auth., No. 12-CV-901 DRH ARL, 2012 WL 1933767, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012).
159
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2018).
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employees,160 but the information thus gained cannot be used to discriminate against
the individual based on disability.161
These medical examinations may reveal evidence of either legal or illegal drug
use. After employment, employers may require examinations of employees if the
examinations are job-related and consistent with business necessity.162 At any point
in time, employers are permitted to inquire whether employees are capable of
performing the essential functions of their jobs.163 In addition, any information
obtained from permitted medical examinations or inquiries has important
protections. The results of any required pre-employment physicals must be kept
separate from other employee records and treated as confidential medical records.164
Any other medical examinations or inquiries also are subject to this requirement.165
Information may be revealed to the extent necessary for work restrictions or
accommodations, however, thus allowing supervisors or managers to be aware of
the employee’s situation.166
Despite these restrictions on medical examinations, employers may acquire
knowledge of employee drug use in many different ways. Drug tests to determine
illegal drug use are not medical examinations under the ADA.167 As landlords may
do with prospective tenants, employers may conduct background checks on
prospective employees that could reveal arrest or conviction records for drug use.
Employers also are allowed to employ reasonable drug testing policies to ensure that
employees are not engaging in illegal drug use.168 Employees who are identified as
recovering from substance abuse may be tested more frequently as well.169
There is thus a multiplicity of ways for landlords and employers to obtain
information about drug use, whether legal or illegal. One way or another, the
information will be difficult to hide. Protection against discriminatory use of the
information is therefore essential.
V. CONCLUSION: REVERSING THE EXCLUSION OF ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Reversing the exclusion of illegal substance abuse from the definition of
disability would enable individuals with substance abuse disorders who use illegal
drugs to claim the protections of the ADA. It would thus put these individuals on a
160
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3:10-250, 2015 WL 5439052, at *38–39 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2015) (stating that drug tests
are not medical examinations under the ADA).
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42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (2018).
169
See Buckley v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 155 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.
1998).
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par with others with disabilities, rather than refusing to protect them from
discrimination because of the character of the drugs that they use. It would reverse
the assumption that people with substance abuse disorders that involve them in
illegal drug use should be treated as criminals for the purpose of excluding them
from any protections of anti-discrimination law.
Reversing the exclusion, however, would not necessarily protect illegal drug
use. Rather, it would place the inquiry where it belongs: on whether any adverse
action is discriminatory. Landlords could insist that tenants be otherwise qualified.
To the extent that engagement in criminal activities is disqualifying for housing or
a job, it would continue to be disqualifying—on the basis that these individuals are
not qualified for what they seek, not on the basis that they cannot question whether
a judgment about whether they are qualified is discriminatory. Whether it is illegal,
drug use may be relevant to an individual’s ability to perform in certain positions,
just as other health conditions may be. Landlords and employers may state
qualification standards—but the import of anti-discrimination law is that these
standards must be justified as job related and based on business necessity. Landlords
and employers also may insist that tenants or employees be qualified for what they
seek and, through the direct threat defense, insist that they not pose safety risks.
However, bringing these determinations about individual abilities to perform jobs
safely within anti-discrimination law will require an individualized inquiry rather
than reliance on stereotypes.
Moreover, knowledge of protection against discrimination might help to
encourage people to reveal the information that could help them get treatment or be
provided with supportive accommodations. Reversing the exclusion of illegal
substance abuse from disability anti-discrimination law is a critical aspect of how
the law can catch up with the recognition that substance abuse is a disorder.

